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The Dog that Lost Its Bark 
The Commission and the Stability Pact 
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When large numbers of drivers begin ignoring the 
speed limit, it is good practice to revisit the original 
rationale and, if reaffirmed, to tighten enforcement, 
especially if the frequency of accidents increases. 
Hence, the EU Commission was right in launching 
a debate about the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), which has been violated by an increasing 
number of EMU member countries. 
Unfortunately, however, the Commission’s 
proposals for reform risk watering down the Pact, 
resulting in an erosion of fiscal discipline. In our 
view, countries presently struggling with 
excessive deficits should implement reinforced 
fiscal adjustment programmes. The case for a 
consolidation of government finances against the 
background of present and prospective 
demographic changes remains very strong.  
The longer-term outlook for the 
European economy and SGP reform 
The SGP was created in order to operationalise 
the general prohibition of ‘excessive’ deficits in 
the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty, which 
introduced the constraints on fiscal policy, 
started from the assumption that nominal GDP 
would grow at 5% per year on trend and that a 
debt ratio of 60% of GDP was bearable. 
Consistent with these assumptions, it stipulated 
that government budget deficits must not exceed 
3% of GDP. 
In hindsight, this deficit limit appears rather 
generous. Reflecting the ECB’s inflation target of 
less than 2% and real potential growth of probably 
only around 1¾% in Euroland, a more realistic 
assumption for Euroland’s nominal trend growth is 
around 3½%. To stabilise the debt ratio at 60% of 
GDP, the deficit would have to be capped at 2.1%. 
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Moreover, ageing of the Euroland population raises 
government liabilities not included in the debt ratio in the 
Maastricht definition. Hence, to keep governments solvent, 
the latter should decline over time, ensuring that total 
government liabilities do not increase on trend over the 
next half century. These facts are generally accepted. 
Nevertheless, neither they nor their obvious implication 
that the conditions in the SGP should be tightened rather 
than loosened are reflected in the Commission’s 
Communication of 3 September 2004. 
Surprisingly, the Commission also seems to have ignored a 
key argument in favour of raising the threshold for 
invoking exceptional circumstances. With the potential 
growth rate having declined in most euro area countries, it 
is much more likely that countries will experience phases 
during which growth is ‘low’ by historical standards. 
Hence, when potential growth is slowing, authorities need 
to continuously update their view about what is 
exceptionally 'sluggish' growth. For example, a growth rate 
of 1.5% would most likely be considered 'sluggish' by 
politicians when compared to the goal of 3% as agreed at 
the Lisbon summit. However, growth of 1.5% might 
already be very close to (and for some countries above) 
potential growth in reality, and thus not qualify as 
'sluggish'.  
The Commission paper in detail 
In its Communication of 3 September 2004, the 
Commission proposed a number of reforms with the stated 
aim to strengthen the SGP, an aim we would support given 
our view that the SGP remains necessary. The Commission 
proposal addresses six main points: 
1.  Prolonged periods of sluggish growth, which are to 
qualify as an “exceptional circumstance” where deficits 
of more than 3% of GDP are allowed 
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2.  Country-specific elements in the enforcement and 
correction of excessive deficits 
3.  Country-specific elements in the definition of medium-
term deficit objectives 
4.  Earlier actions to correct inadequate budgetary 
developments 
5.  Better links between general economic policy 
surveillance, fiscal policy surveillance, and national 
budgetary processes 
6.  Improved enforcement through ‘early warnings’ 
directly issued by the Commission; better fiscal 
statistics; greater peer pressure; greater transparency 
and accountability of the member states’ budgetary 
policies; and closer involvement of national 
parliaments in fiscal policy coordination 
EU Finance Ministers, who will decide about any formal 
changes to the SGP early next year, are likely to welcome 
the first three points of the Commission’s proposal for 
reform, because they allow them to rebalance the mix of 
discretion and rules embedded in the Pact in favour of the 
former. In our view, however, this is likely to result in a 
watering down of the SGP since governments will always 
find excuses for an excessive deficit. 
At first glance, allowing a period of sluggish growth to 
qualify as an 'exceptional circumstance' (granting an 
exception from the 3% deficit limit) seems to recognise that 
the accumulated output gap over several years matters more 
for government finances than that of a single period. The 
output gap could be larger after a long period of positive 
growth below potential than after a short recession. 
However, a reduction in potential growth is often 
recognised only after several years of weak growth. At the 
beginning of a period of lower growth, it is difficult to 
decide whether this is temporary or permanent. The 
temptation to regard it as temporary will be impossible to 
resist when this has the implication that higher deficits are 
allowed.  
Moreover, even on a purely technical basis, the experience 
of 2003 shows that output gap estimates are subject to large 
revisions as new data come in. For example, when the very 
low growth rate for 2003 was put in the Commission’s 
model for the German potential growth rate, the estimate of 
the output gap had to be revised downward substantially, 
with the consequence that the estimate of the cyclically 
adjusted deficit increased by almost 0.5% of GDP. Hence, 
points 1-2 of the Commission’s proposal appear to allow 
necessary adjustment to be delayed and hence create the 
risk of a sizeable accumulation of excessive deficits and 
debt.  
More generally, quantifying potential growth is an 
extremely difficult technical judgment which leaves much 
room for disagreement even among experts, as one can see 
by looking at the differences in estimates of potential 
growth coming from such respected institutions as the 
OECD, the IMF and the ECB. If estimates of potential 
growth rates acquire immediate political importance, it will 
be extremely difficult to shield the staff of the Commission 
from political pressure or to impede the Council to just 
come up with higher estimates. Therefore, the need for 
potential GDP growth estimates in the implementation of 
the SGP should be minimised (although it cannot be 
entirely eliminated), and estimates should be carried out, if 
at all possible, by an independent institution. 
Points 4-6 pf the Commission communication may find 
more widespread support. However, the budgetary 
surveillance procedures proposed by the Commission lack 
teeth. History shows that the EU has never been able to 
pressure countries to consolidate government finances 
during good times. Hence, there is the serious risk that 
mostly lip service will be paid to this part of the 
Commission’s proposals without much tangible action. 
Nevertheless, one thing may change. After the revelation 
that Greece has been able to systematically underreport its 
deficit for a number of years, it has become obvious that 
the capacity of the Commission to scrutinise and evaluate 
fiscal policy in member countries must be reinforced. As 
documented in a special report of the CEPS 
Macroeconomic Policy Group, entitled The Nine Lives of 
the Stability Pact and published in January 2004, the 
Commission cannot really supervise fiscal policy when it 
has only one full-time official per member country on 
average working in this area. Manpower is scarcer for the 
smaller than the larger member countries. Hence, it is not 
surprising that in the case of Portugal, and more recently 
Greece, the Commission was not able to discover large 
discrepancies in reported deficits. The capacity of the 
Commission to check national data, both ex post and ex 
ante, and the budget plans for the current year, must be 
strengthened. 
These data problems – together with the monitoring 
problems resulting from the very large budget forecasting 
errors, as we also documented in our earlier report – bolster 
the case for the establishment of independent national 
budget agencies. These agencies would improve monitoring 
and provide alternative forecasts as a reality check on 
optimistic government assumptions.  
Policy conclusions 
The SGP was designed so that countries would be able to 
let automatic stabilisers work fully. For that, countries were 
required to achieve as soon as possible the desired starting 
point, namely a budget close to balance or in small surplus. 
The design of the SGP would then allow countries to 
weather cyclical fluctuations while respecting the 3% limit. 
This background is important for understanding the SGP 
fiasco, and it is essential to understand why the situation 
now is even worse than it was at the beginning of EMU. 
Why did some countries breach the 3% limit? Because they 
did not meet the commitment to achieve a budget position 
close to balance or in small surplus before the cyclical 
downturn of 2001-03. Thus, the SGP parameters were no THE COMMISSION AND THE STABILITY PACT | 3 
 
longer adequate. But the failure was due to domestic fiscal 
policy decisions, not to the SGP parameters. 
Today the situation is the even worse. There are two groups 
of countries: those which have the required budgetary 
starting condition of close to balance or small surplus, and 
those which do not. Any SGP re-parameterisation is going 
to fail for the countries that do not meet the initial 
requirement. If the European fiscal policy framework is to 
regain any credibility, it must ensure that the ‘sinners’ 
behave better this time. Peer pressure for greater fiscal 
discipline has proven ineffective. Hence, the sinners must 
be required to publish detailed plans how they intend to 
achieve the desired initial budgetary conditions as soon as 
feasible. They must demonstrate ownership of these plans 
by investing political capital in them, for example by 
committing before their own parliaments to a rigorous 
three-year plan approved by the Commission and to report 
back any deviation before their parliaments. This procedure 
is a model used by the IMF for programmes that have gone 
off-track: in this case, the authorities must make additional 
efforts to put the programme back on track. 
Current prospects are not very encouraging: the French 
plan to reduce the budget deficit to 2.9% in 2005 is almost 
entirely dependent on a transfer of 0.5% of GDP from the 
energy utilities in return for assuming pension liabilities. 
Not only does this worsen the long-term fiscal outlook, but 
it is a reminder of how France only managed to meet the 
Maastricht criteria via another one-off transfer – that time 
from France Telecom. Fiscal adjustment plans for Germany 
and Italy presently also lack the necessary rigor to achieve 
lasting reductions in deficits. 
If the sinners do not make the extra effort, the SGP will 
become an empty shell. When a country defaults on its 
debt, markets typically require an extra risk premium for its 
debt. The countries that ‘defaulted’ on their commitment 
the first time must now pay an extra price to restore their 
credibility. Markets do not impose discipline in Euroland –
at least not now. However, the prospect of a sudden 
awakening of markets to the lack of EU fiscal discipline 
should never be ruled out. The ‘sinning’ countries must 
therefore provide additional collateral this time. 
For the virtuous countries, discipline should be focused on 
not letting the cyclically-adjusted balance deteriorate, in 
order to prevent growth masking a deterioration of the 
underlying fiscal stance. It is maintenance work, rather than 
repair, but it is still needed. It is up to the Eurogroup to 
decide. But this may be the last chance to take forceful 
action against the sinners before the demographic shock 
starts hitting and debt levels start to accelerate.  
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